Diff for "SecurityTeam/Specifications/Karmic/AppArmorLibvirtProfile"

AppArmorLibvirtProfile

Differences between revisions 66 and 67

Describe SecurityTeam/Specifications/AppArmorLibvirtProfile here.

Launchpad Entry: security-karmic-missing-profiles
Created: 2009-06-17
Contributors: jdstrand
Packages affected: libvirt and apparmor
Launchpad Bug: 388422

Summary

Virtual machines started by libvirt run unconfined. If there is a bug in the hypervisor, a guest could potentially attack other guests or the host. Providing an AppArmor profile would help protect against this. As of libvirt 0.6.1, sVirt has been merged and contains all the necessary hooks through a plugin architecture to confine a virtual machine, and includes an SELinux plugin. Providing an AppArmor plugin would help increase security and contain virtual machines in Ubuntu.

Release Note

Libvirt now contains AppArmor integration when using KVM or QEMU. Libvirtd is now configured to launch virtual machines that are confined by uniquely restrictive AppArmor profiles. This feature significantly improves virtualization in Ubuntu by providing user-space host protection as well as guest isolation.

Rationale

Virtual machines started by libvirt run unconfined. Since virtual machines with security bugs, misconfigured software or nefarious users could be deployed, it is imperative that the host machine is protected from attack by a malicious guest and guests be isolated from each other. Generally speaking, the hypervisor takes care of this isolation, however, bugs in the hypervisor may allow attackers to circumvent the hypervisor's protections.

AppArmor can increase security and help protect the host and isolate guests in the event of bugs in the hypervisor.

Design

When a virtual machine is started, determine if a profile is currently defined for the machine, and use it if available. If not, generate a new profile for the machine based on a template, which is by default a very restrictive profile allowing access to disk files, and anything else needed to run, such as the pid, monitor and log files.

Virtual machines should have a unique profile specific to that machine. To ensure uniqueness, the profile name will be derived from the UUID of the virtual machine. These profiles should be configurable, either by adjusting the profile template for new machines, creating/modifying the VM profile directly or through the use of AppArmor abstractions. This will allow for administrators to fine-tune confinement for individual machines if desired.

In addition to the above, initially confine libvirtd itself with a permissive (perhaps even complain-mode only) profile. libvirtd should not be allowed to create arbitrary profiles or modify profiles directly, so as to not allow libvirtd to potentially (ie via a security bug in libvirtd itself) bootstrap out of AppArmor confinement, should it be in a restrictive enforcing profile. Because root privileges are needed to manipulate AppArmor profiles, qemu:///session will not be supported at this time. As such, the implementation and profile must allow for a confined libvirtd with qemu:///session guests running unconfined.

Note that the upstream security plugin framework in libvirt 0.6.1 only works with qemu (and kvm), and not other technologies like Xen or OpenVZ. If and when these technologies are supported by the upstream framework, AppArmor confinement should work with them as well.

Implementation

Create an AppArmor plugin for libvirt using the security plugin framework provided by libvirt 0.6.1. Use aa_change_profile() from (sys/apparmor.h) in the hook for virExecWithHook(). This allows libvirtd to run in it's own profile and then change to a new profile in the kvm child after fork().
Provide a permissive libvirt AppArmor profile (/etc/apparmor.d/usr.sbin.libvirtd)
Provide a restrictive AppArmor abstraction for guest profiles to include (/etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/libvirt-qemu)
Provide a restrictive AppArmor template to be used when generating new profiles (/etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/TEMPLATE).
Write virt-aa-helper which libvirtd calls to create/update the profiles and load them. This application can create a profile based on TEMPLATE, load a profile, unload a profile and delete a profile.
Provide a restrictive AppArmor profile for virt-aa-helper (as part of /etc/apparmor.d/usr.sbin.libvirtd)

Blocked by

bug #375422: AppArmor not available in 9.10 (Fix Released)
bug #401931: [karmic] aa_change_profile() no longer works (Fix Released)
bug #408773: apparmor capabilities not working properly (Fix Released)

Test/Demo Plan

Please note that 9.04 packages for libvirt 0.6.1 will be supplied in a PPA. Due to bug #390810, the libvirtd profile must be in complain mode, and not enforcing (though virt-aa-helper and guests will be in enforce mode).

Packages for 9.10 are available in the Ubuntu archive.

libvirtd (daemon)

All of the libvirtd tests should be done with with AppArmor enabled (default install), with AppArmor not started (sudo /etc/init.d/apparmor stop) and with AppArmor disabled (boot with apparmor.enabled=0). Note that libvirtd will always need to be restarted if you change its profile from unconfined to complain/enforcing or vice-versa. All tests assume qemu:///system unless otherwise noted.

Test case	9.04	9.10
`virsh capabilities` (when enabled, should show apparmor secmodel under <host>)	pass	pass
`virsh capabilities` (security = 'none' in /etc/libvirt/qemu.conf, no secmodel under <host>)	NEEDED	pass
`virsh dominfo <guest>` (when enabled, should show 'Security model: apparmor')¹	pass	pass
`virsh dumpxml <guest>` (when enabled, should show <seclabel> section)¹	pass	pass
`virsh start <guest>` (when enabled, should be confined, otherwise unconfined)²	pass	pass
`virsh shutdown <guest>` (when enabled, should unload the profile)²	pass	pass
`virsh destroy <guest>` (when enabled, should unload the profile)²	pass	pass
`virsh -c qemu:///session start <guest>` (should be unconfined)	pass	pass
`virsh -c qemu:///session shutdown <guest>`	pass	pass
`virsh -c qemu:///session destroy <guest>`	pass	pass

needs to be started first
use sudo aa-status

Guests

Test case	9.04	9.10
start confined libvirtd, guest without existing profile confined on start	pass	pass
start confined libvirtd, guest with existing profile confined on start	pass	pass
`virsh dumpxml <guest>` (when enabled, should show <seclabel> section)¹	pass	pass
add a disk via virt-manager²	pass	pass
add a disk via `virsh define`²	pass	pass
uses a disk with '/./' or '/../' in the path³	pass	pass
uses a disk with symlink in the path³	pass	pass
uses a non-existent disk (should fail gracefully)	pass	pass⁴
hotplugging a disk (add a USB disk with virt-manager)	FAIL⁵	pass
add a CDROM iso	pass	pass
disconnect a connected CDROM iso²	pass	pass
install with virt-install	pass	pass
install with vmbuilder	pass	pass⁶
install with virt-manager and local ISO	pass	pass
install with virt-manager and local ISO with no storage	N/A	pass⁷
install with virt-manager and local cdrom	pass	pass
install with virt-manager and network tree	NEEDED	NEEDED
install with virt-manager and PXE	NEEDED	NEEDED
virt-clone	pass	pass
add non-disk hardware to the guest	pass (added tablet)	pass (added generic usb mouse)
modifying hardware in the guest	pass (changed memory)	pass (changed memory)
default networking (NAT with dnsmasq)	pass	pass
bridged networking	pass	pass
USB passthrough	NEEDED	policy⁸
eucalyptus	NEEDED	NEEDED
serial/console	NEEDED	pass
alternate kernel	NEEDED	pass
alternate initrd	NEEDED	pass
attach-device	NEEDED	pass⁹
detach-device	NEEDED	pass⁹
attach-disk	NEEDED	pass⁹
detach-disk	NEEDED	pass⁹

guest may need to be started first
disk is removed from /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvir-<uuid>.files on next machine boot
AppArmor will normalize the path, virt-aa-helper should do the same
fails as gracefully as libvirt 0.7.0 does (which is not very-- it waits for the monitor timeout instead of reporting the disk doesn't exist)
in 9.04, /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvir-<uuid>.files is updated and the profile reloaded, but the disk doesn't work until reboot of guest.
must use grub-legacy on the host due to bug #408739
while initial install is ok, subsequent reboots don't work (no disks in the profile even though it is in the xml)
this works fine if the profile allows it. Currently, a commented out section has been added to /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/libvirt-qemu that the user can uncomment if desired
attach-device and attach-disk occasionally trigger spurious AppArmor denied errors in the kernel, but the disk is available in the guest (bug #435527). Also, qemu-kvm bug #432154 may prevent this from working for all cases, but using libvirt with an older version works fine.

Hypervisors

The security plugin framework in libvirt 0.6.1 and higher currently only supports kvm/qemu and not xen, openvz, etc. When using a hypervisor that doesn't support the security driver, libvirt simply ignores the driver.

Test case	9.04	9.10
kvm (should be confined)	pass	pass
qemu (should be confined)	pass	pass
kvm from qemu-kvm (should be confined)	N/A	pass
qemu from qemu-kvm (should be confined)	N/A	pass
kqemu (should be confined)	pass	pass

NOTE: these work but if error the label doesn't get removed, so libvirtd has to be started (may be limitation of security plugin framework)

Remote vs local

Please note that if testing this on a virtual machine, you'll need to change the virtual machine's libvirt network configuration like so:

$ virsh net-dumpxml default | sed 's/192.168.122/192.168.123/g' > /tmp/foo.xml
$ virsh net-define /tmp/foo.xml
$ virsh net-destroy default
$ virsh net-start default

Otherwise, you will lose network connectivity in the guest.

Test case	9.04	9.10
unconfined client runs `virsh -c qemu+ssh://<confined host>/system capabilities` (shows apparmor secmodel under <host>)	pass	pass
unconfined client runs `virsh -c qemu+ssh://<confined host>/system dominfo <guest>` (has 'Security model: apparmor')¹	pass	pass
unconfined client runs `virsh -c qemu+ssh://<confined host>/system dumpxml <guest>` (has seclabel)¹	pass	pass
unconfined client starts guest on remote host with AppArmor (remote guest is confined)	pass	pass
unconfined client shuts down guest on remote host with AppArmor (profile removed)	pass	pass
unconfined client destroys guest on remote host with AppArmor (profile removed)	pass	pass
confined client² runs `virsh -c qemu+ssh://<unconfined host>/system capabilities` (no security driver)	pass	pass
confined client² runs `virsh -c qemu+ssh://<unconfined host>/system dominfo <guest>` (no security model)	pass	pass
confined client² runs `virsh -c qemu+ssh://<unconfined host>/system dumpxml <guest>` (no seclabel)	pass	pass
confined client² starts guest on remote host without AppArmor	pass	pass
confined client² shuts down guest on remote host without AppArmor	pass	pass
confined client² destroys guest on remote host without AppArmor	pass	pass
unconfined client runs `virsh -c qemu+ssh://<unconfined host>/system capabilities` (no security driver)	pass	pass
unconfined client runs `virsh -c qemu+ssh://<unconfined host>/system dominfo <guest>` (no security model)	pass	pass
unconfined client runs `virsh -c qemu+ssh://<unconfined host>/system dumpxml <guest>` (no seclabel)	pass	pass
unconfined client starts guest on remote host without AppArmor (remote guest is unconfined)	pass	pass
unconfined client shuts down guest on remote host without AppArmor	pass	pass
unconfined client destroys guest on remote host without AppArmor	pass	pass

guest may need to be started first
'confined client' means AppArmor is enabled on this host, not that virsh has a profile

Upstream bugs

verify https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=499569 is fixed (CONFIRMED OK)
verify https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=507555 is not a problem (CONFIRMED OK)
verify https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=493692 is not a problem (CONFIRMED OK)
verify https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=505625 is not a problem on Karmic (CONFIRMED OK)

Other investigations

These haven't been tested, but should be considered:

vde (per Soren and Dustin, not supported)
kvm-pxe (per Soren and Dustin, not important)
storage pools (per Soren, not a problem)
migration

Unresolved issues

qemu:///session is not supported because libvirtd is started as a non-root user and cannot write and load AppArmor profiles.

Submit upstream

Discussion started in libvirt mailing list.

CategorySpec

SecurityTeam/Specifications/Karmic/AppArmorLibvirtProfile (last edited 2011-05-04 13:55:02 by pool-71-114-233-7)

-  ⇤ ← Revision 66 as of 2009-09-24 16:13:26 → 
  Size: 19452
  Editor: pool-71-114-226-175
  Comment:
+   ← Revision 67 as of 2009-09-24 18:51:33 → ⇥
  Size: 19694
  Editor: pool-71-114-226-175
  Comment: add more on attach/detach
-Deletions are marked like this.
+Additions are marked like this.
 Line 143:
-|| attach-disk                                                                                 || '''NEEDED'''          || '''NEEDED'''^9^       ||
|| detach-disk                                                                                 || '''NEEDED'''          || '''NEEDED'''^9^       ||
+|| attach-disk                                                                                 || '''NEEDED'''          || pass^9^               ||
|| detach-disk                                                                                 || '''NEEDED'''          || pass^9^               ||
 Line 153:
-. qemu-kvm [[https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/qemu-kvm/+bug/432154|bug #432154]] prevents this from working, but using libvirt with an older version works fine
+. attach-device and attach-disk occasionally trigger spurious AppArmor denied errors in the kernel, but the disk is available in the guest ([[https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libvirt/+bug/435527|bug #435527]]). Also, qemu-kvm [[https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/qemu-kvm/+bug/432154|bug #432154]] may prevent this from working for all cases, but using libvirt with an older version works fine.

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